

GOV 388L (38525)
International Organization
Spring 2019
M 12:30-3:30 PM
BATTS 1.104

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Course Overview:

This is a graduate political science/government seminar studying international organizations and institutions. International institutions, defined as both formal organizations and less formal sets of rules, norms, and expectations, have increased in number and diversity in the post-WWII international system. This growth prompts a number of questions: Why do states form and act through international institutions? Can international institutions alter states' behavior? If so, through what mechanisms? How do international institutions influence domestic politics? How does power play out in international organizations? Can international organizations create and spread new norms about appropriate behavior?

At the same time, some observers suggest we are witnessing a backlash to the globalization of governance. From anti-IMF protests in Latin America in the 1980s and 90s, to anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, to the rise of populist forces in Europe in the United States in present days that eschew multilateralism in favor of national sovereignty, some see the decline of the post-WWII institutional order. What drives these trends? What explains when organizations persist, and what explains when they decline?

These are some of the questions that we will address throughout the semester. This course emphasis on the careful exploration and development of theoretical ideas and expectations and attention to empirical evidence that can arbitrate between competing theoretical explanations. In that sense, it is not only a course about reading research but also about how to conduct research.

This seminar also aims to prepare graduate students for comprehensive exams in international relations and/or conducting original and cutting-edge research in the area of international organizations. The readings and assignments are organized with these goals in mind.

Readings:

We will cover approximately four to six professional journal length articles or a book equivalent each week. Students are expected to have carefully completed the readings in advance to facilitate useful discussion.

If you are planning on taking comprehensive exams in international relations, you should be familiar with, at a minimum, the required readings on the syllabus. The recommended readings are meant to provide additional, but by no means exhaustive, works that can help you prepare for exams and/or generate and conduct original research. Obviously, don't try to read all the recommended reading now; it's merely there as a reference.

The following books will be available for purchase at the University coop:

Cliff Carrubba and Matt Gabel. 2015. *International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements: A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union*. Cambridge University Press.

Martha Finnemore. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Tana Johnson. 2014. *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance*. Oxford University Press.

Robert O. Keohane. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in International Political Economy*. Princeton University Press.

Randall Stone. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

All other readings are available electronically through the library e-journals page (<http://www.lib.utexas.edu>).

Assignments:

Analytical papers:

Four times during the semester you will write a 3-5 page analytical essay addressing a question pertinent to the reading we've been discussing in class. These questions will be distributed at regular intervals throughout the class, identified on the course calendar. These are not research papers in the sense that they require original empirical research. Rather, they are aimed at helping you synthesize the material and place it within a larger context of international relations scholarship. The goal of doing so is to generate ideas for future research. Thus, these papers are primarily "thought" essays. The goal will be to think about how the research we've been discussing addresses questions in the field or real-world events.

Note that synthesis is not summary. Some basic summary may be required to orient the reader, but the bulk of the work in these papers will be constructed an argument about how we should think of this research, what questions it answers, what questions it leaves open, and what areas are fertile for future research. Papers should develop an argument clearly. In this sense, these papers should also serve as practice for comprehensive exams. Those exams are meant to test mastery of the field. Knowledge

of what has been written is only part of that mastery. The rest is the internalization of ideas and the original synthesis of those ideas into a larger web of understanding that should guide your own research and future knowledge creation. Original valid argumentation is thus central to demonstrating mastery.

These papers together will be worth 30% of your grade.

Theory and Research Design Paper:

The ultimate assignment of the class will be a 15-20 page paper that will (a) identify a research question; (b) explain why it is important to study; (c) discuss, using existing literature, why the question has not been previously answered sufficiently; (d) develop a theory, first by defining key concepts, then stating premises, and finally by establishing observable implications (hypotheses); (e) plan an approach to gather data (qualitative, quantitative, experimental, case-based, historical, etc.) and conduct analysis that could adjudicate between the aforementioned theory and other explanations.

This paper should be thought of as a trial run at a research proposal or dissertation prospectus (prospectuses, being for a longer project, are necessarily more involved; this might be a proposal that will culminate in a journal article).

First, the emphasis should be on clearly identifying a research-worthy question. This is harder than it sounds. The question should not be too narrow nor too broad. It should not merely address a topic. It should be stated in terms of a puzzle that can be answered. It should anticipate an original explanation for that puzzle.

Second, the paper should clearly address the “so what” question. Space in scholarly journals, grant money, and readers’ attention and time are all scarce. A key part of the research process is convincing the wider community that what you are researching is indeed worthwhile. Other scholars’ understanding of and judgement of what is worthwhile will be shaped by their understandings of the discipline and of the world. Thus, a good answer to the “so-what” question should identify some pattern or phenomena that readers will not already think is well-understood and also convincingly demonstrate that the answers are not already clearly provided. Justify why the reader should be consuming this piece of research.

Third, because your own time and research resources are scarce, it is vital that you develop a clear causal understanding of your own answer to the question. If there is ambiguity, you will miss important elements when crafting an empirical approach. Thus, the paper should carefully develop its theoretical answer. Not only must this theory be clear to the researcher, however. It also must be clear to the reader so that the reader can make the logical connection from basic assumptions to the claims that will form the basis of observable expectations. If readers cannot follow this chain, they will not be convinced that a hypothesis logically flows from the argument, which will undermine their confidence that the evidence gathered is the correct evidence or that it speaks to the argument. Therefore, the theory should be written in a way that is clear to the reader, making it easy to follow the logical progression as well as identify the basis for empirical expectations.

Fourth, the proposed empirical research should make clear how the explanation for the phenomenon in question articulated above can be distinguished from competing

explanations. That is, if your argument is right, what should we see? How would you go about showing it? This is a creative undertaking at this stage. All else equal, it is best to propose research that can be actually, practically carried out. But the focus here should be on creating the best research design to isolate evidence that would support or not support the observable implications derived from one's argument. That evidence can take a variety of forms. But importantly, you should be careful to think through whether there are other possible explanations that would predict overlapping evidence. If so, it will be important to find ways, through empirical exploration, to distinguish your argument from alternatives.

We all, despite our best intentions, procrastinate to some degree or another. It is good to have meetings and discuss ideas with colleagues, coauthors, and advisors to keep on track. **Thus, I have identified some dates on the course calendar in which I would like to touch base with each of you** regarding these projects. These meetings are required. They need not be in person. You can email or we can have a telephone meeting. But you must check in and discuss your progress.

This project will be worth 30% of your final grade.

Class attendance and active participation:

Class attendance is required. The success of this seminar, in terms of what you get out of it, depends crucially on the active participation and input of everyone.

25% of your grade will therefore come from how actively you participate by asking questions, raising relevant points, and maintaining a respectful scholarly atmosphere.

Discussion leading:

Once during the semester you will be responsible for starting the class conversation and helping to lead discussion. You will begin discussion with a 5-minute synthesis of the material for the week and identify questions you think should be on the table for discussion. Importantly, **THIS SHOULD NOT BE A SUMMARY OF THE READINGS**. Assume we have all read the material. Instead, think of this as like the intro to a job talk or conference presentation. You have to frame the larger topic or question and place it in some relevance for the audience. References to the reading should serve the larger goal of highlighting important questions within the literature, important ties to pressing real world questions, etc. You'll probably want to practice and time yourself in front of a mirror, a friend, significant other, or pet. You may even want to prepare slides for this. And please distribute a list of at least five discussion questions on Canvas no later than 10am the Monday before class (ideally do it Sunday night).

15% of your grade will come from discussion leading.

Other policies:

Late Papers/Extensions: Absolutely no late papers will be accepted, pending a serious illness that physically prevents you from completing the paper, a death in the family that

prevents you from completing the paper, or an otherwise legitimate life catastrophe that prevents you from completing the paper. Please notify me immediately if any of these events occurs.

Students with disabilities: Students with disabilities may request appropriate academic accommodations from the Division of Diversity and Community Engagement, Services for Students with Disabilities, 471-6259, <http://www.utexas.edu/diversity/ddce/ssd/>

Counseling and mental health resources: The semester can be very stressful. Please seek help if you notice warning signs of depression, substance abuse, or other form of mental illness. See <https://cmhc.utexas.edu>

Religious holy days: A student who misses classes or other required activities, including examinations, for the observance of a religious holy day should inform the instructor as far in advance of the absence as possible, so that arrangements can be made to complete an assignment within a reasonable time after the absence.

Use of E-mail for Official Correspondence to Students: All students should be familiar with the University's official e-mail student notification policy. It is the student's responsibility to keep the University informed as to changes in his or her e-mail address. Students are expected to check e-mail on a frequent and regular basis in order to stay current with University-related communications, recognizing that certain communications may be time-critical. The complete text of this policy and instructions for updating your e-mail address are available at <http://www.utexas.edu/its/policies/emailnotify.html>

Policy on Scholastic Dishonesty: Students who violate University rules on scholastic dishonesty are subject to disciplinary penalties, including the possibility of failure in the course and/or dismissal from the University. Since such dishonesty harms the individual, all students and the integrity of the University, policies on scholastic dishonesty will be strictly enforced. For further information, please visit the Office of Student Conduct and Academic Integrity website at <http://deanofstudents.utexas.edu/conduct/>.

University of Texas Honor Code: "As A Student Of The University Of Texas At Austin, I Shall Abide By The Core Values Of The University And Uphold Academic Integrity."

Course Schedule:

Week 1 Why States Cooperate (1/29)

- Beth Simmons and Lisa Martin. 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52(4): 729-757.
- Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in International Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-7.

Recommended:

- Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3-32.
- Michael Gilligan and Leslie Johns. 2012. "Formal Models of International Institutions." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15:221-43.
- Friederich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. "International Organization: A State of the Art on an art of the State." *International Organization* 40(4): 753-775.
- Alexander Thompson and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "International Organization." *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics* 5: 692-722.
- Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner. 1998. "International Organization and the Study of World Politics." *International Organization* 50(4): 645-685.
- Robert Powell. 1994. Review Essay of *Anarchy in International Relations Theory: the Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate* in *International Organization* 48(2): 313-344.
- Young, Oran. 1986. "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions." *World Politics* 39: 104-22.
- John J. Mearsheimer. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19(3): 5-49.
- Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20(1): 39-51.
- Joseph Grieco. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization* 42(Summer): 485-508.
- Robert Axelrod. 1982. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kenneth Oye. 1986. *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton University Press.
- Stephen Krasner. 1983. *International Regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 226-254.
- Snidal, Duncan 1985. "Coordination Versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 79(4): 923-942.
- Lloyd Gruber. 2001. *Ruling the World*. Princeton University Press.

Week 2: Delegation (2/4)

Daniel Nelson and Michael Tieney. 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform." *International Organization* 57(2): 241-276.

Stone, *Controlling Institutions*, chapters 1-3

Mark Copelovitch. 2010. "Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49-77.

Recommended:

Tana Johnson and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. "International Bureaucrats and the Formation of International Organizations: Institutional Design Sweetens the Pot." *International Organization* 68(1): 177-209.

Mark Pollack. 1997. "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community." *International Organization* 51(1): 99-134.

Leslie Johns. 2007. "A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats." *International Organization* 61(2): 245-275.

Hawkins, Lake, Nelson and Tierney. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. (edited volume). Cambridge University Press.

Week 3: Normative/Ideational Views on IO creation (2/11)

Finnemore. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Chapters 1-4.

James March and Johan Olsen. 1998. "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders." *International Organization* 52(4): 943-969.

****1st ANALYTICAL PAPER ASSIGNMENT TOPIC HANDED OUT (DUE THE FOLLOWING WEEK 2/18)****

Week 4: Delegation 2 – autonomy and bureaucratic culture (2/18)

Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* 53(4): 699-732.

Julia Gray. 2018. "Life, Death, or Zombies? The Vitality of International Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 62(1): 1-13.

Johnson, *Organizational Progeny*, chapters 1-5.

Recommended:

Celeste Wallander. 2000. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War."

****MANDATORY OFFICE HOURS OR OTHER CONTACT TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS FOR THEORY/RESEARCH DESIGN PAPER****

Week 5: Compliance and Shallow v. Deep Cooperation (2/25)

- Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47(2): 175-202.
- George W. Downes, David M. Roake and Peter Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50(3): 379-406.
- Fearon, James. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52(2): 269-305.
- Morrow, James. 2007. "When Do States Follow with the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 559-572.
- Nate Jensen and Eddy Malesky. 2018. "Nonstate Actors and Compliance with International Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention." *International Organization* 72(1): 33-69.

Recommended:

- Dai, Xinyan. 2005 "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *International Organization* 59(2): 363-398.
- Morrow, James D. 1994. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information." *International Organization* 48(3): 387-423.
- Martin, Lisa. 1992. *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul Hensel. 2007. "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 721-737.

Week 6: Enforcement (3/4)

- Eric Reinhardt. 2001. "Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2): 174-195.
- Michael Gilligan. 2006. "Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime." *International Organization* 60(4): 935-967.
- Randall Stone. 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa." *American Political Science Review* 98(4).
- Inken von Borzyskowski and Felicity Vabulus. Forthcoming. "Credible Commitments? Explaining IGO Suspensions to Sanction Political Backsliding." *International Studies Quarterly*. [Link](#)
- Johns, Leslie and Krzysztof Pelc. 2018. "Free-Riding on Enforcement in the WTO." *Journal of Politics* 80(3): 873-889.

Recommended:

- Emilie Hafner-Burton. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization* 59(3): 593-629.
- Dan Drezner. 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive?" *International Organization* 54(1): 73-102.

- Randy Stone. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62(4): 489-620.
- Alexander Thompson. 2006. "Management Under Anarchy: the International Politics of Climate Change." *Climatic Change* 78(1): 7-29.
- Jana von Stein. 2008. "The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 243-268.
- Allison Carnegie. 2014. "States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 108(1): 54-70.

****2ND ANALYTICAL PAPER ASSIGNMENT TOPIC HANDED OUT (DUE THE FOLLOWING WEEK 3/11)****

Week 7: Monitoring and Institutional Design (3/11)

- Susan Hyde. 2007. "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." *World Politics* 60(1): 37-63.
- Ronald Mitchell. 1994. "Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." *International Organization* 48(3): 425-458.
- Carnegie, Allison and Austin Carson. 2018. "The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order." *International Organization* 72(3): 627-657.

Recommended:

- Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55(4): 761-699.
- Ronald Mitchell 1998. "Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes." *International Studies Quarterly* 42(1): 109-130.
- Xinyuan Dai. 2002. "Information Systems in Treaty Regimes." *World Politics*. 54(4): 405-436.
- Kenneth Abbott. 1993. "Trust, but Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements." *Cornell International Law Journal* 26(1)
- James Morrow. 1994. Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Vs. Information. *International Organization* 48(3): 387-423.
- Susan Hyde. 2011. *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*. Cambridge University Press.
- Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov. 2013. "Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation." *International Organization* 68(2): 329-359.
- Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito, and Christer Jonsson. 2014. "Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations." *International Organization* 68(4): 741-744.

****MANDATORY OFFICE HOURS OR OTHER CONTACT TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY/RESEARCH DESIGN PAPER****

****SPRING BREAK 3/18-3/23****

Week 8: Flexibility (3/25)

- B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Agreements: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55(4): 829-857.
- Barbara Koremenos. 2005. "Contracting Around International Uncertainty." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 549-565.
- Eric Reinhardt and Jeff Kucik. 2009. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62(3): 477-505.
- Krzysztof Pelc. 2009. "Seeking Escape: the Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(2): 349-368.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Laurence Helfer, and Christopher Fariss. 2011. "Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogation from Human Rights Treaties." *International Organization* 65(4): 673-707.
- Stone, *Controlling Institutions*, Chs. 4-6.

Recommended:

- B. Peter Rosendorff. 2005 "Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 389-400.
- Barbara Koremenos. 2001. "Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility." *International Organization* 55(2): 289-325.
- Morelli, Massimo and Giovanni. 2007. "Self-enforcing Voting in International Organizations." *American Economic Review*.
- Christina Schneider. 2011. "Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 331-355.
- Krzysztof Pelc. 2011. "Why do Some Countries get better WTO Accession Terms than Others?" *International Organization* 65(4): 639-672.

Week 9: International Law I (4/1)

- Jeff Staton and Will Moore. 2011. "Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics." *International Organization* 65(3): 553-587.
- Erik Voeten. 2008. "The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights." *American Political Science Review* 102(4): 417-433.
- Yon Lupu. 2013. Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of Human Rights Agreements." *International Organization* 67(3): 469-503.
- Leslie Johns. 2012. "Courts as Coordinators: Endogenous Enforcement and Jurisdiction in International Adjudication." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56: 256-289.

Recommended:

- Carrubba, Clifford J. 2009. "A Model of the Endogenous Development of Judicial Institutions in Federal and International Systems." *Journal of Politics* 71(1): 44-69.
- Beth Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*.
- Michael Gilligan, Leslie Johns, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2010. "Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1): 5-38.
- Emily Hencken Ritter and Scott Wolford. 2012. "Bargaining and the Effectiveness of International Criminal Regimes." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 24(2): 151-173.
- Marc Busch and Krzysztof J. Pelc. 2010. "The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization." *International Organization* 64(2): 257-280.
- Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67.
- Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. "Legalization and World Politics." *International Organization* 54(3): 385-399.
- Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli. 1993. "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration." *International Organization* 47(1): 41-76.
- Karen Alter. 1998. "Who are 'The Masters of the Treaty?' European Governments and the European Court of Justice." *International Organization* 52(1): 121-147.
- Michael Tomz. 2007. "The Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs." Manuscript, Stanford University.
- Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67.
- Oona Hathaway. 2005. "Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law." *University of Chicago Law Review* 72: 469-536.
- Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2007. "The International Court of Justice and the World's Three Legal Systems." *Journal of Politics* 69(2):397-415.
- Daniel Kono. 2007. "Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation." *Journal of Politics* 69(3): 746-759.

****3RD ANALYTICAL PAPER ASSIGNMENT TOPIC HANDED OUT (DUE THE FOLLOWING WEEK 4/8)****

Week 10: International Law II (4/8)

- Cliff Carrubba and Matt Gabel. 2015. *International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements: A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union*. Cambridge University Press. Chs. 1-5.
- Prorok, Alyssa. 2017. "The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and Civil Conflict Termination." *International Organization* 71(2): 213-243.

Paul Huth, Sarah Croco, and Ben Appel. 2011. "Law and the Use of Force in World Politics: The Varied Effects of Law on the Exercise of Military Force in Territorial Disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 17-31.

Week 11: Credible Commitments and Treaty Entry (4/15)

- Simmons, Beth. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 819-835.
- Jan Von Stein. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611-622.
- Beth Simmons and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. "The Constraining Power of International Treaties." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 623-631.
- Simmons and Danner. 2010. "Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court." *International Organization* 64(2): 225-256.
- Terrence Chapman and Stephen Chaudoin. 2013. "Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court." *International Studies Quarterly* (57)2: 400-409.
- Andrew Kerner. 2009 "Why Should I Believe You: The Sources of Credibility in Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Effects" *International Studies Quarterly*. 53(1):73- 102.
- James Vreeland. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62(1): 65-101.

Recommended:

- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz. 1996. "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations." *International Organization* 50(1): 109-139.
- Jana Von Stein. 2010. "The International Law and Politics of Climate Change." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 243-268.
- Ashley Leeds. 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments and International Cooperation." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 979-1002.
- Ashley Leeds. 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties." *International Organization* 57(4): 801-827.
- Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun. 2007. "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Treaties?" *Journal of Politics* 69(4).
- Erik Gartzke and Kristian Gleditsch. 2004. "Why Democracies May Actually be Less Reliable Allies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 775-795.
- Jay Goodliffe, Darren Hawkins, Christine Horne, and Daniel Nielson. 2011. "Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 131-147.

****MANDATORY OFFICE HOURS OR OTHER CONTACT TO DISCUSS
QUESTIONS FOR THEORY/RESEARCH DESIGN PAPER****

Week 12: Institutions and Domestic Politics (4/22)

- Robert Putnam. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.
- Mansfield, Edward, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56(3):477-513.
- David Stasavage. 2004. "Open-Door or Closed Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining." *International Organization* 58(4): 667-703.
- Christina Davis. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 153-169.
- Stephen Chaudoin. 2014. "Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes." *International Organization* 68(4): 877-911.

Recommended:

- Stephen Chaudoin. 2014. "Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions." *International Organization* 68(1): 235-256.
- Xinyuan Dai. 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *International Organization* 59(2): 363-398.
- Jon Pevehouse. 2002. "Democracy from the Outside In? International Organizations and Democratization." *International Organization* 56(3): 519-549.
- James Raymond Vreeland. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dan Drezner ed. 2003. *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jon Pevehouse. 2005. *Democracy From Above? Regional Organizations and Democratization*. Princeton University Press.
- Terrence Chapman. 2009. "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." *International Organization* 63(4): 733-764.
- Terrence Chapman, Johannes Urpelainen, and Scott Wolford. 2013. "International Bargaining, Endogenous Domestic Constraints, and Democratic Accountability." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.
- Elena McLean and Randall Stone. 2011. "The Kyoto Protocol: Two-Level Bargaining and European Integration." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 99-113.

****4th ANALYTICAL PAPER ASSIGNMENT TOPIC HANDED OUT (DUE THE FOLLOWING WEEK 4/29)****

Week 13: Dispute Settlement/Forum Shopping (4/29)

- Eric Reinhardt and Marc Busch. 2006. "Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement." *World Politics* 58: 446-477.

- March Busch. 2008. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *International Organization* 61(4): 735-761.
- Asif Efrat and Abraham Newman. 2016. "Deciding to Defer: The Importance of Fairness in Resolving Transnational Jurisdictional Conflicts." *International Organization* 70(2): 409-441

Recommended:

- Beth Simmons. 2002. "Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(2): 829-856.
- Paul Huth and Todd Allee. 2006. "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover." *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 219-234.

****FINAL MANDATORY OFFICE HOURS OR OTHER CONTACT TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS FOR THEORY/RESEARCH DESIGN PAPER****

Week 14: Institutions and Markets (5/6)

- Julia Gray. 2009. "International Organization as Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 931-949.
- Meredith Wilf. 2016. "Credibility and Distributional Effects of International Banking Regulations: Evidence From US Bank Stock Market Returns." *International Organization* 70(4): 763-796.
- Terrence Chapman, Songying Fang, Xin Li, and Randy Stone. 2016. "Mixed Signals: Crisis Lending and Capital Markets." *British Journal of Political Science*.

****FINAL THEORY/RESEARCH DESIGN PAPER DUE 5/15****

Recommended additional reading on regionalism and on IOs and security that I used to assign but cut:

- Edward Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 57(4): 829-862.
- Jon Pevehouse. "With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 611-626.
- Walter Mattli. 1999. *The Logic of Regional Intergration: Europe and Beyond*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters TBA
- Moravscik. 1998. *The Choice For Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse. 2000. "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict." *International Organization*

- Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner. 1999. "The New Wave of Regionalism." *International Organization* 53(3): 589-627.
- Dan Reiter. 2001. "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy." *International Security* 25(Spring): 41-67.
- Daniela Donno. 2010. "Who is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms." *International Organization* 64(4): 593-625.
- Yoram Haftel. 2007. "Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes." *International Organization* 61(1): 217-237.
- Ian Hurd. 2007. *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Authority in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton University Press.
- Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *American Political Science Review* 95(4): 845-859.
- Terrence Chapman and Scott Wolford. 2009. "International Organizations, Strategy, and Crisis Bargaining." *Journal of Politics* 72(1): 227-242.
- Alexander Thompson. 2006. "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization* 60(1): 1-34.
- Terrence Chapman. 2012. *Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.